EPINOVA Research Signals

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A Systemic Theory of Escalation and the Loss-of-Control Threshold in Networked Conflict

This working paper develops a systemic theory of escalation centered on the loss-of-control threshold (LoCT) as a dynamic state-transition condition. It models escalation as an endogenous process driven by systemic pressure, structural node criticality, and perception feedback. Strategic success is redefined as temporal control—the ability to remain below the LoCT—making conflict a competition over sustained controllability rather than decisive victory. 

Competition over the Loss-of-Control Threshold: 

A Systemic Theory of Escalation in Networked Conflict

This brief assesses a potential U.S. seizure of Kharg Island using the loss-of-control threshold (LoCT) framework. It argues that U.S. operational superiority enables access but not low-cost control, while Iran’s cost-imposition strategy drives systemic pressure. Conflict outcomes depend on sustaining control under cumulative multi-domain stress rather than decisive battlefield victory.

Who Loses Control First?

Threshold Competition in the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict

This working paper analyzes the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict as threshold competition rather than decisive war. It introduces the loss-of-control threshold (LoCT) to explain escalation failure under systemic pressure. The United States faces overextension, Israel escalation lock-in, and Iran a retaliation loop. Outcomes depend on resilience in delaying loss of control rather than battlefield superiority.

Post-Nodal Warfare:

Will Distributed AI Command Replace Human Leadership in High-Intensity Conflict?

This policy brief introduces post-nodal warfare, where distributed AI-enabled command reduces reliance on leadership nodes and weakens decapitation strategies. It identifies a shift toward system-level command functions, highlighting operational advantages alongside new vulnerabilities in cybersecurity, data integrity, governance, and escalation, with implications for future high-intensity conflict. 

Systemic Warfare in the Networked Age: 

Operational Systems, Information Competition, and Cumulative Pressure

This working paper introduces systemic warfare as a framework for understanding how contemporary conflict operates through cumulative pressure across interconnected operational systems and networked information environments. It integrates Operational System Warfare and information competition, and proposes two analytical constructs: the Operational Node Criticality Score (ONCS) and the Systemic Pressure Index (SPI). Drawing on an illustration from the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran confrontation, the paper shows how disruptions propagate and generate nonlinear effects, offering a theoretically grounded model with testable implications for future research.

Terminal Platform Nodes and Narrative Competition in the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict

This policy brief examines narrative competition in the U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict through Terminal Platform Nodes (TPNs)—the algorithmically mediated points where narratives reach mass audiences. Using 5,000 social media posts from X, Facebook, TikTok, and Instagram (Feb 28–Mar 14, 2026), it finds that narrative influence is shaped less by message production than by platform algorithms and engagement dynamics. Monitoring TPNs is therefore critical for understanding contemporary information warfare and strengthening the resilience of democratic information environments. 

Industrial War and Network War: 

Operational Logics in the Russia–Ukraine War and the U.S.–Israel–Iran Conflict

This working paper compares the Russia–Ukraine War and the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran conflict as two distinct operational logics of contemporary warfare: industrial warfare centered on territorial control and network-oriented warfare aimed at imposing systemic pressure on distributed military infrastructure. It argues that modern conflicts increasingly operate through networked operational systems in which repeated strikes impose cumulative costs, operational nodes become critical targets, and globally deployed powers face growing vulnerability to cross-regional pressure. 

Cloud Under Fire:

Hyperscale Data Centers and the Rise of Cyber-Physical Warfare

This working paper examines the strategic significance of hyperscale cloud infrastructure in modern conflict. Using the concept of Digital Strategic Nodes (DSNs) and the reported strikes near AWS facilities during the 2026 U.S.–Iran conflict as a case study, it analyzes how concentrated cloud infrastructure may create systemic vulnerabilities. The study maps 28 regional digital nodes and highlights the growing role of cyber-physical disruption in warfare. 

Narrative Underperformance in the First Week of the U.S.–Israel–Iran War

This policy brief examines information competition during the first week of the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war. Despite substantial U.S. communication activity, differences in communication tempo, narrative continuity, media-format compatibility, and expectation dynamics shaped perceptions of momentum. A best-effort estimate suggests visible communication tempo approximated 1.2 : 1 : 2.1 (United States : Israel : Iran), highlighting the advantage of continuous, feed-compatible messaging in early-stage conflicts. 

Losing the Narrative:

Communication Tempo, Expectation Asymmetry, and Perception Effects in the First Week of the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran War

This working paper analyzes why the United States appeared to lose narrative momentum in the information environment during the first week of the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war despite contested battlefield outcomes. Using a best-effort estimate of visible official communication outputs (Feb 28–Mar 6, 2026), it argues that differences in disclosure tempo, narrative continuity, media-format compatibility, and expectation asymmetry significantly shaped early-phase perception dynamics. 

The First Week of the U.S.–Israel–Iran War:

Battlefield Assessment and Next-Phase Risks

This policy brief assesses the first seven days of the 2026 U.S.–Israel–Iran war. It argues that the conflict has moved beyond the level of a limited punitive exchange but remains below the threshold of full-scale regional war. The central finding is that the war has entered an unstable intermediate condition characterized by sustained missile-UAV exchange, widening maritime and economic spillover, and growing allied operational integration. The brief finds that the most important driver of next-phase escalation is not average strike performance, but the risk of a threshold-crossing event, including a successful strike on a critical node, a major civilian-casualty incident, sustained deterioration in interception performance, or explicit expansion of war aims. It concludes that the conflict remains under constrained escalation, but the margin of stability is narrowing. 

The U.S.–Iran War and East Asia’s Next Strategic Test:

Why the Middle East Conflict May Reshape Risk in the Western Pacific

This policy brief argues that the U.S.–Iran war could reshape deterrence dynamics beyond the Middle East by straining U.S. assets, alliance decision space, and perceptions of American resolve. It identifies East Asia as the most plausible next strategic test, with a Taiwan-centered coercive crisis as the most likely serious pathway, the South China Sea as the most likely limited-clash pathway, and the Korean Peninsula as the fastest escalation theater. Based on qualitative analysis of open-source materials, the brief contributes to research on strategic risk, alliance strain, and cross-regional deterrence under missile-intensive conflict conditions.